that it remained seised of the matter, indicated that, at least from a formal perspective, it was exercising its primary responsibility.
Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998) contains another, more unusual reference to the Security Council's powers. It reaffirms that "under the Charter of the United Nations, primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is conferred on the Security Council". At the time (October 1998), NATO military intervention was already a much debated topic. Since action by the General Assembly was not a realistic prospect, it appears that this was an attempt to remind NATO of the Security Council's prerogative. Under Article 53(1) of the United Nations Charter, enforcement action by regional arrangements or regional agencies is not permissible without the authorization of the Security Council. NATO does not see itself as a regional arrangement or agency under Chapter VIII of the Charter. But this fact does not free it from the Charter's restraints.
The Security Council has been flexible about endorsing measures involving the use of force by a regional organization in the past. In 1990, a multinational military force set up by the West African regional organization ECOWAS was sent into Liberia to help end the civil war there, without prior authorization by the Security Council. On 19 November 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 788 (1992) in which it commended and supported the action by ECOWAS. But it is difficult to draw far-reaching conclusions from this case. It can hardly be read as doing away with the need for Security Council authorization under Article 53(1).
Humanitarian intervention is sometimes invoked as a justification for military action that is normally prohibited by international law. But this is a highly dubious legal argument. It does not command sufficient authority to qualify as a rule of customary international law. It is contested even if nationals of the intervening State are in peril. Its power to justify armed intervention on behalf of nationals of the oppressing State is even weaker.
There may well be situations where positive law is morally unsuitable to deal which a situation of extreme urgency and gravity, where the observance of the procedures prescribed by law lead to evident injustice and humanitarian hardship. No reasonable human being would passively witness genocide in order to await the vote of a body that may or may not provide the legal basis for doing what everybody perceives as right and necessary. Can the bombardment of Yugoslavia by NATO, which started on 24 March 1999, be justified as an extralegal but morally just humanitarian intervention? The purpose of such an intervention can only be to take the Steps absolutely necessary to stop the immediate atrocities. Its purpose cannot be to punish or to impose a legal regime for the future. To this end it must be suitable to achieve its humanitarian goal. It must also be proportionate, that is, use the minimum force absolutely necessary to help the victims.
As to suitability, military experts warned from the beginning that aerial bombardment was an insufficient strategy to stop Yugoslav forces in their policy of murder, mass rape and expulsion. The events during the weeks following 24 March 1999 have proved them right. The incidence of these violations has actually increased dramatically leading to the expulsion or displacement of most of the population in the province. Even if the sharp rise in atrocities by Serb forces is not to be attributed to NATO's action, this action has done nothing to stop or reduce the atrocities. Aerial bombardment was a predictably unsuitable tool to help the victims.
Proportionality is more difficult to assess. The fact that the measures taken did not achieve the desired result does not necessarily demonstrate that they were not disproportionate. In fact, much of the military action seems to have been less designed to aid the victims directly than to put pressure on the leadership and population of Serbia. Attacks on the country's general infrastructure probably had some effect on its military capability. But the primary purpose appears to have been to demonstrate to the government and the population that it would be wiser to comply with NATO's demands. Leaving aside questions of applicability of the First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 1949, attacks on the general power system and water supply of the population would be impermissible under Article 54(2) of Protocol l.
One of the aims of the military action against Yugoslavia is to induce its President to agree to a peace accord based on the Rambouillet framework. The letter from President Clinton to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of 26 March 1999 explaining the military action makes this clear. If this aim is achieved, the resulting agreement may well be void under the law of treaties. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
This note was written on 7 June 1999 before the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999 .
